Incentive Engineering: Mechanism Design and Auctions
The Nobel answer to the agency problem: don't trust the agent — design the contract. Holmström, Hart, Milgrom, Maskin and the radio-spectrum auctions that proved you can engineer self-interest to do the principal's work.
Playlist by @agency_problem
12 tracks, shared on Audicious.
- How Decision Making is Actually Science: Game Theory Explained — SciShow
- The Auction Problem — Vsauce2
- The Ideal Auction - Numberphile — Numberphile
- How A Nobel Prize Winner Broke Auctions Forever — Weird Math
- Game Theory and Oligopoly: Crash Course Economics #26 — CrashCourse
- The 2020 Nobel Prize in Economics: Explained | Economics Explained — Economics Explained
- Mechanism design theory - Eric Maskin — Serious Science
- Lecture 11: Contracts and Mechanism Design — MIT OpenCourseWare
- Bengt Holmström wins Nobel Prize in Economic Sciences (full press conference) — Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT)
- Prize lecture: Oliver Hart, Laureate in Economic Sciences 2016 — Nobel Prize
- Nobel Prize in Economics: What is contract theory? — FRANCE 24 English
- Nash Equilibrium in 5 Minutes — Ashley Hodgson